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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
courts of any discretion to extend it.196 It has also been held that the
parties themselves cannot extend the period by agreement. 197
Almost invariably, inattention to the form required by CPLR
7503(c), with respect to both the notice of intention to arbitrate and the
application for a stay, is fatal. 198 However, the Second Department, in
Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Granelli,199 recently ignored alleged
technical defects in the demand which were "at most nonprejudicial
irregularities which should be disregarded." 200
This shift in attitude is a welcome one among harried practitioners
who have experienced the often burdensome results of rigid application
of the section. The First Department is also so inclined, as evidenced by
Empire Mutual Insurance Co. v. Levy. 201 Therein, the respondent uti-
lized the notice of intention to arbitrate so as to prevent compliance
with the ten-day provision by the petitioner. The court refused to allow
such manipulation and granted the stay. Although the holding was
limited to the facts, one may infer that courts will be increasingly
sensitive to the equities in particular situations.
CPLR 7511(a): Date of actual delivery of arbitration award must be
stated in pleading ninety-day statute of limitations.
CPLR 7511(a) provides that a party moving to vacate or modify
an arbitration award must do so within ninety days after its delivery to
him. In Ganser v. New York Telephone Co.,20 2 the Appellate Division,
First Department, considered a petition to set aside an arbitration award
rendered on April 30, 1971. The date of delivery of the award was not
alleged or otherwise indicated. The original petition, filed on July 27,
1971, was followed by a motion noticed on August 24, 1971. The Su-
preme Court, New York County, dismissed the petition on the ground
that more than ninety days had elapsed from the date of the award be-
fore the motion to vacate was made. The Appellate Division, First De-
partment, reversed, strictly construing CPLR 7511(a) to require that
106 See CPLR 201.
197 See General Acc. Fire & Life Assur. Corp. v. Cerretto, 60 Misc. 2d 216, 303 N.Y.S.2d
223 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1969) (mem.), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 44 ST.
JOHN'S L. Rv. 758, 768 (1970).
198 See, e.g., Chasin v. Chasin, 37 App. Div. 2d 839, 326 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dep't 1971)
(mem.); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Szwec, 36 App. Div. 2d 863, 321 N.Y.S.2d 800
(2d Dep't 1971) (mem.); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Keane, 28 App. Div. 2d 703, 280 N.Y.S.2d
972 (2d Dep't 1967) (mem.); Napolitano v. MVAIC, 26 App. Div. 2d 757, 272 N.Y.S.2d
220 (3d Dep't 1966) (mem.); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Neithardt, 24 App. Div. 2d 941, 265
N.Y.S.2d 128 (Ist Dep't 1965) (mem.).
199 37 App. Div. 2d 113, 322 N.YS.2d 390 (2d Dep't 1971).
2001d. at 115, 322 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (dictum).
201 85 App. Div. 2d 916, 316 N.Y.S.2d 24 (Ist Dep't 1970) (mem.), discussed in The
Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 536, 549 (1971).
202 39 App. Div. 2d 653, 331 N.Y.S.2d 914 (Ist Dep't 1972) (mem.).
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where the ninety-day statute of limitations2 3 is pleaded as an affirmative
defense, the date of delivery of the award must be stated.
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(ii): Arbitration award affirmed, where challenged ar-
bitrator had prior attorney-client relationship with one party, when op-
posing party knowingly waived its objection.
CPLR 7511(b)(1)(ii) empowers a court to vacate an arbitration
award when a "neutral" arbitrator is actually "partial."2°-4 In Baar &
Beards, Inc. v. Oleg Cassini, Inc.,20 5 the parties made an exclusive licens-
ing agreement which provided for the arbitration of disputes according
to current rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). A dis-
pute arose, and Baar & Beards, Inc., the appellant, sought arbitration.
One of the arbitrators appointed by the AAA had represented the ap-
pellant's president six years earlier, a fact of which Oleg Cassini, Inc.,
the respondent, was immediately notified by the appellant. The respon-
dent objected, but the AAA refused to remove the contested arbitrator.
The respondent subsequently signed a statement accepting the arbitra-
tion panel.
Following the award, the appellant sought confirmation in the Su-
preme Court, New York County, and the respondent opposed on the
grounds of bias and misconduct. The court vacated the award as unfair.
Fhe Appellate Division, First Department,20 affirmed, holding that the
appearance of bias was present.
The Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the matter remitted to
special term for proceedings in accordance with its decision. In review-
ing the order vacating the award, the Court held that the respondent
had knowingly waived its objection.20 7
COURT OF CLAiMs AcT
Ct. Cl. Act § 10: Statutes of limitations or conditions precedent?
In Lewis v. State,208 the Court of Claims recently held that the
time provisions set forth in section 10(2) of the Court of Claims Act
for wrongful death actions against the state are conditions precedent
203The ninety-day period is a limitations provision which establishes a maximum
time for proceeding, but sets no minimum time period, and does not impinge on a party's
right to move under other CPLR sections. Foreign Operations, Ltd. v. Miller, 52 Misc.
2d 828, 276 N.Y.S.2d 942 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967).
204 See H. WACHIELL, NEW YoRK PRACrICE UNDER THE CPLR 268-71 (3d ed. 1970).
See generally The Quarterly Survey, 43 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 802, 345 (1968).
205 30 N.Y.2d 649, 282 N.E.2d 624, 331 N.YS.2d 670 (mem.), motion for reargument
denied, 80 N.Y.2d 790, 285 N.E.2d 322, 334 N.Y.S.2d 1027 (1972).
206 37 App. Div. 2d 106, 322 N.YS.2d 462 (1st Dep't 1971), discussed in The Quarterly
Survey, 46 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 335, 385 (1971).
207 30 N.Y.2d at 649, 282 N.E.2d at 685, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 670.
208 69 Misc. 2d 1031, 382 N.Y.S.2d 292 (Ct. Cl. 1972) (mem.).
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